Abstract. We assume a scenario where an attacker can mount several independent attacks on a single CPU. Each attack can be run several times in independent ways. Each attack can succeed after a given number of steps with some given and known probability. A natural question is to wonder what is the optimal strategy to run steps of the attacks in a sequence. In this paper, we develop a formalism to tackle this problem. When the number of attacks is infinite, we show that there is a magic number of steps m such that the optimal strategy is to run an attack for m steps and to try again with another attack until one succeeds. We also study the case of a finite number of attacks. We describe this problem when the attacks are exhaustive key searches, but the result is more general. We apply our result to the learning parity with noise (LPN) problem and the password search problem. Although the optimal m decreases as the distribution is more biased, we observe a phase transition in all cases: the decrease is very abrupt from m corresponding to exhaustive search on a single target to m = 1 corresponding to running a single step of the attack on each target. For all practical biased examples, we show that the best strategy is to use m = 1. For LPN, this means to guess that the noise vector is 0 and to solve the secret by Gaussian elimination. This is actually better than all variants of the Blum-KalaiWasserman (BKW) algorithm.
Introduction
We assume that there are an infinite number of independent keys K 1 , K 2 , . . . and that we want to find at least one of these keys by trials with minimal complexity. Each key search can be stopped and resumed. The problem is to find the optimal strategy to run several partial key searches in a sequence. In this optimization problem, we assume that the distributions D i for each K i are known. We denote D = (D 1 , D 2 , . . .). Consider the problem of guessing a key K i , drawn following D i , which is not necessarily uniform. We assume that we try all key values exhaustively from the first to the last following a fixed ordering. If we stop the key search on K i after m trials, the sequence of trials is denoted by ii · · · i = i m . It has a worst-case complexity m and a probability of success which we denote by Pr D (i m ).
Instead of running parallel key searches in sequence, we could consider any other attack which decomposes in steps of the same complexity and in which each step has a specific probability to be the succeeding one. We assume that the ith attack has a probability Pr D (i m ) to succeed within m steps and that each step has a complexity 1. The fundamental problem is to wonder how to run steps of these attacks in a sequence so that we minimize the complexity until one attack succeeds. For instance, we could run attack 1 for up to m steps and decide to give up and try again with attack 2 if it fails for attack 1, and so on. We denote by s = 1 m 2 m 3 m · · · this strategy. Unsurprisingly, when the D i 's are the same, the average complexity of s is the ratio
Pr D (1 m ) where C D (1 m ) is the expected complexity of the strategy 1 m which only runs attack 1 for m steps 1 and Pr D (1 m ) is its probability of success. Traditionally, when we want to compare single-target attacks with different complexity C and probability of success p, we use as a rule of the thumb to compare the ratio p(m) is often decreasing (so has an L shape) or decreasing then increasing (with a U shape) and it is optimal to target p(m) = 1 2 . But sometimes, the curve can be increasing with a Γ shape. In this case, it is better to run an attack with very low probability of success and to try again until this succeeds. In some papers, e.g. [14] , we consider min
C(m)
p(m) as a complexity metric to compare attacks. Our framework justifies this choice.
LPN and Learning with Errors (LWE) [21] are two appealing problems in cryptography. In both cases, the adversary receives a matrix V and a vector C = V s + D where s is a secret vector and D is a noise vector. For LPN, the best solving algorithm was presented in Asiacrypt 2014 [12] . It brings an improvement over the well-known BKW [5] and its variants [15, 11] . The best algorithm has a sub-exponential complexity.
Assuming that V is invertible, by guessing D we can solve s and check it with extra equations. So, this problem can be expressed as the one of guessing a correct vector D of small weight, which defines a biased distribution. Here, the distribution of D corresponds to the weighted concatenation of uniform distributions among vectors of the same weight. We can thus study this problem in our formalism. This was used in [8] . This algorithm is also cited in [6] and by Lyubashevsky 2 .
Both LPN and LWE fall in the aforementioned scenario of guessing a k-bit biased noise vector by a simple transformation. Work on breaking cryptosystems with biased keys was also done in [18] .
The guessing game that we describe in our paper also matches well the password guessing scenario where an attacker tries to gain access to a system by hacking an account of an employee. There exists an extensive work on the cryptanalytic time-memory tradeoffs for password guessing [2, 13, 20, 3, 19, 4] , but the game we analyse here requires no pre-computation done by the attacker.
Our results. We develop a formalism to compare strategies and derive some useful lemmas. We show that when we can run an infinite number of independent attacks of the same distribution, an optimal strategy is of the form 1 m 2 m 3 m · · · and it has complexity for some "magic" value m. This justifies the rule of the thumb to compare attacks with different probabilities of success.
When the probability that an attack succeeds at each new step decreases (e.g., because we try possible key values in decreasing order of likelihood), there are two remarkable extreme cases: m = n (where n is the maximal number of steps) corresponds to the normal single-target exhaustive search with a complexity equal to the guesswork entropy [17] of the distribution; m = 1 corresponds to trying attacks for a single step until it works, with complexity 2 −H ∞ , where H ∞ is the min-entropy of the distribution.
When looking at the "magic" value m in terms of the distribution D, we observe that in many cases there is a phase transition: when D is very close to uniform, we have m = n. As soon as it becomes slightly biased, we have m = 1. There is no graceful decrease from m = n to m = 1.
We also treat the case where we have a finite number |D| of independent attacks to run. We show that there is an optimal "magic" sequence m 1 , m 2 , . . . such that an optimal strategy has form 1
The best strategy is first to run all attacks for m 1 steps in a sequence then to continue to run them for m 2 steps in a sequence, and so on. Although our results look pretty natural, we show that there are distributions making the analysis counter-intuitive. Proving these results is actually non trivial.
We apply this formalism to LPN by guessing the noise vector then performing a Gaussian elimination to extract the secret. The optimal m decreases as the probability τ to have an error in a parity bit decreases from 2k , where k is the length of the secret, the optimal m is 1: this corresponds to guessing that we have no noise at all. So, there is a phase transition.
Furthermore, for LPN with τ = k
, which is what is used in many cryptographic constructions, the obtained complexity is poly · e √ k which is much better than the usual poly · 2 k log 2 k that we obtain for variants of the BKW algorithm [6] . More generally, we obtain a complexity of poly · e −k ln(1−τ) . It is not better than the BKW variants for constant τ but becomes interesting when τ < [16] .
For LWE, the phase transition is similar, but the algorithm for m = 1 is not better than the BKW variants. This is due to the 0 noise having a much lower probability in LWE (which is 1 − τ for LPN) in the discrete Gaussian distribution in Z q .
For password search, we tried several empirical distributions of passwords and obtained again that the optimal m is m = 1. So, the complexity is 2 −H ∞ .
Besides the 3 problems we study here, we believe that our results can prove to be useful in other cryptographic applications.
Structure of the paper. Section 2 formalizes the problem and presents a few useful results. In Section 3 we characterize the optimal strategies and show they can be given a special regular structure. We then apply this in Section 4 with LPN and password recovery. Due to lack of space, we do the same for LWE in the full version of this paper. We study the phase transition of the "magic" number m in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
The STEP game
In this section we introduce our framework through which we address the fundamental question of what is the best strategy to succeed in at least one attack when we can step several independent attacks. Let D = (D 1 , D 2 , . . .) be a tuple of independent distributions. If it is finite, |D| denotes the number of distributions. We formalize our framework as a game where we have a ppt adversary A and an oracle that has a sequence of keys
At the beginning, the oracle assigns the keys according to their distribution. These distributions are known to the adversary A. The adversary will test each key K i by exhaustive search following a given ordering of possible values. We can assume that values are sorted by decreasing order of likelihood to obtain a minimal complexity but this is not necessary in our analysis. We only assume a fixed order. So, our framework generalizes to other types of attacks in which we cannot choose the order of the steps. Each test on K i corresponds to a step in the exhaustive search for K i . In general, we write "i" in a sequence to denote that we run one new step of the ith attack. The sequence of "i"s defines a strategy s. It can be finite or not. The sequence of steps we follow is thus a sequence of indices. For instance, i m means "run the K i search for m steps". The oracle is an algorithm that has a special command: STEP(i). When queried with the command STEP(i), the oracle runs one more step of the i th attack ( so, it increments a counter t i and tests if K i = t i , assuming that possible key values are numbered from 1). If this happens then the adversary wins. The adversary wins as soon as one attack succeeds (i.e., he guesses one of the keys from the sequence K 1 , K 2 , . . . ). 
Definition 1 (Strategies
, the probability of the j first values under D i .
When considering the key search, it may be useful to assume that distributions are sorted by decreasing likelihood. We note that the equivalent condition to p j ≥ p j+1 with the incremental description is
We define the distribution that the keys are not among the already tested ones. 
Definition 3 (Residual distribution
]. Hence, defining distributions in the incremental way makes the residual distribution being just a shift of the original one.
We write Pr D (s ′ |¬s) = Pr D|¬s (s ′ ) and C D (s ′ |¬s) = C D|¬s (s ′ ).
Next, we prove a list of useful lemmas in order to compute complexities, compare strategies, etc.
Lemma 4 (Success probability). Let s be a strategy for D. The success probability is computed by
Proof. The failure corresponds to the case where for all i, K i is not in {1, . . . , #occ s (i)}. 
Proof. The first equation is trivial from the definition of residual distributions and conditional probabilities. The prefix strategy s succeeds with probability Pr D (s). Let c be the complexity of s conditioned to the event that s succeeds. Clearly, the complexity of ss ′ conditioned to this event is equal to c. The complexity of ss ′ conditioned to the opposite event is equal to |s|
). The complexity of s conditioned to that s fails is equal to |s|. So,
From these two equations, we obtain the result.
⊓ ⊔
Lemma 6 (Complexity with incremental distributions)
.
Proof. By induction, the probability that the strategy fails on the first t − 1 steps is
and m ≤ n, due to Lemma 6 we have
The second equality uses the relations from Definition 2.
We want to concatenate an isomorphic copy w of a strategy v to another strategy u. For this, we make sure that w and u have no index in common. 
Lemma 9 (Complexity of a repetition of disjoint copies). Let s be a non-empty strat
Otherwise, we have
For r going to ∞, we respectively obtain C D (ss +1 s +2 · · · ) = +∞ and
For instance, for s = 1 m and D i all equal, the disjoint isomorphic copies of s are s +r = (1 + r) m . I.e., we run m steps the (1 + r)th attack. So,
Proof. We prove it by induction on r. This is trivial for r = 1.
If it is true for r − 2, then
We now consider r = ∞. For an infinite number of i.i.d distributions we have
where
is ordered, G m corresponds to the guesswork entropy of the key with distribution D 1 |1 m .
We can see two extreme cases for s = 1 m 2 m · · · . On one end we have a strategy of exhaustively searching the key until it is found, i.e. take m = n. On the other extreme we have a strategy where the adversary tests just one key before switching to another key, i.e. m = 1. For the sequences s = 12 · · · and s = 1 n 2 n · · · , i.e. m = 1 and m = n, when D 1 is ordered by decreasing likelihood, we obtain the following expected complexity:
where H ∞ (D 1 ) and G n denote the min-entropy and the guesswork entropy of the distribution D 1 , respectively.
We now define a way to compare partial strategies.
Definition 11 (Strategy comparison). We define
minC D (s) = inf s ′ ;Pr D (ss ′ )=1 C D (ss ′ ) the infimum of C D (ss ′ ), i.e.
the greatest of its lower bounds. We write s ≤ D s ′ if and only if minC
D (s) ≤ minC D (s ′ ). A strategy s is optimal if minC D (s) = minC D ( / 0), where / 0
is the empty strategy (i.e. the strategy running no step at all).
So, s is better than s ′ if we can reach lower complexities by starting with s instead of s ′ . The partial strategy s is optimal if we can still reach the optimal complexity when we start by s.
Lemma 12 (Best prefixes are best strategies). If u and v are permutations of each other, we have u ≤ D v if and only if C
D (u) ≤ C D (v).
Proof. Note that Pr
. So, the result is trivial in this case. Let us now assume that Pr D (u) < 1 and Pr D (v) < 1. For any s ′ , by using Lemma 5 we have
The same holds for v. Since u and v are permutations of each other, we have D|¬u
Optimal strategy
The question we address in this paper is: what is the optimal strategy for the adversary so that he obtains the best complexity in our STEP formalism? That is, we try to find the optimal sequence s for Algorithm 1. At a first glance, we may think that a greedy strategy always making a step which is the most likely to succeed is an optimal strategy. We show below that this is wrong. Sometimes, it is better to run a series of unlikely steps in one given attack because we can then run a much more likely one of the same attack after these steps are complete. However, criteria to find this strategy are not trivial at all. The greedy algorithm is based on looking at the i for which the next applicable p ′ j in D i is the largest. With our formalism, this defines as follows.
Definition 13 (Greedy strategy). Let s be a strategy for D. We say that s is greedy if
The following example shows that the greedy strategy is not always optimal.
Example 14. We take |D| = ∞ and all D i equal to D i = ( , 1], the greedy approach would test the strategy s = 1211 that has a complexity of
This is greater than 53 36 , the complexity of the strategy 111. Next, we note that we may have no optimal strategy as the following example shows.
Example 15 (Distribution with no optimal strategy). Let q i be an increasing sequence of probabilities which tends towards 1 without reaching it. Let
n ) which tends towards 1 as i grows. So, 1 is the best lower bound of the complexity of full strategies. But there is no full strategy of complexity 1.
When the number of different distributions is finite, optimal strategies exist. 
Lemma 16 (Existence of an optimal full strategy).
In all cases, as s has a probability to succeed of 1, s is a full strategy.
What remains to be proven is that C D (s) = c. We now denote by s i the ith step of s. Let q t be the probability that s fails on the first t − 1 steps. We have C D (s) = ∑ 
Here are examples of optimal m for different distributions. 
Example 18 (Uniform distribution). For the uniform distribution
p i = 1 n , with 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
.
The best strategy is to exhaustively search the key until it is found. 
Example 19 (Geometric distribution
When we have a finite number of distributions, we may have no optimal strategy of the form in Th. 17. We may have multiple layers of repetition of i m as the following result shows. 
We provide toy examples below. 
Proof of Th. 17
To prove the result, we first state a useful lemma. Proof. Due to Lemma 5, when Pr D (s) < 1 we have
Since s ′ does not make use of the distributions which are dropped in D|¬s, we have
This is also clearly the case when Pr D (s) = 1. Similarly,
So, this inequality is equivalent to
We can now prove Th. 17.
Proof (of Th. 17).
Due to Lemma 16, we know that optimal full strategies exist. Let s be one of these. We let i be the index of an arbitrary key which is tested in s. We can write s = u 0 i m 1 u 1 i m 2 · · · i m r u r where i appears in no u j and m j > 0 for all j, and u 1 , . . . , u r−1 are non-empty.
Since s is optimal, by permuting i m j and either u j−1 or u j , we obtain larger complexities. So, by applying Lemma 24, we obtain
We now want to replace u r in s by some isomorphic copy of s which is not overlapping with u 0 i m 1 u 1 i m 2 · · · i m r . Due to the optimality of s, we would deduce
≤ C D (s) which would imply that the repetition of isomorphic copies of i m 1 are at least as good as s, so
= C D (s) due to the optimality of s. But to replace u r in s by the isomorphic copy of s, we need to rewrite the original s containing u r by some isomorphic copy in which indices are left free to implement another isomorphic copy of s.
For that, we split the sequence (1, 2, 3, . . .) into two subsequences v and v ′ which are non-overlapping (i.e. v t = v t ′ for all t and t ′ ), complete (i.e. for every integer j, v contains j or v ′ contains j), and representing each distribution with infinite number of occurrences (i.e. for all j, there exist infinite sequences t 1 < t 2 < · · · and t Following the split of s, the strategy s ′ can be written s
If we replace u ′ r in s ′ by s ′′ , since s ′ is optimal, we obtain a larger complexity. So,
These two strategies have the prefix
We can write their complexities by splitting this common prefix using Lemma 5. By eliminating the common terms, we deduce Pr D (i m 1 ) . Since s is optimal, we have
Proof of Th. 21
For the proof of Theorem 21 we need the result of the following lemma. Lemma 25 will be used in two ways. 
The proof of Lemma 25 is given in Appendix B.
In what follows, we say that a strategy is in a normal form if for all t, i → #occ s 1 ···s t (i) is a non-increasing function, i.e. #occ s 1 ···s t (i) ≥ #occ s 1 ···s t (i + 1) for all i. For instance, 1112322133 is normal as the number of STEP (1) is at no time lower than the number of STEP(2) and the same for the number of STEP(2) and STEP(3).
Since all distributions are the same, all strategies can be rewritten into an equivalent one in a normal form: for this, for the smallest t such that there exists i such that #occ s 1 ···s t (i) < #occ s 1 ···s t (i + 1), it must be that s t = i + 1 and #occ s 1 ···s t−1 (i) = #occ s 1 ···s t−1 (i + 1). We can permute all values i and i + 1 in the tail s t s t+1 · · · and obtain an equivalent strategy on which the function becomes non-increasing at step t and is unchanged before. By performing enough such rewriting, we obtain an equivalent strategy in normal form. For instance, 12231332 is not normal. The smallest t is t = 3 when we make a second STEP(2) while we only did a single STEP (1) . So, we permute 1 and 2 at this time and obtain 12132331. Then, we have t = 7 and permute 2 and 3 to obtain 12132321. Then, again t = 7 to permute 1 and 2 to obtain 12132312 which is normal.
We now prove Th. 21.
Proof (of Th. 21).
Let s be an optimal strategy. Due to the assumptions, it must be finite. We assume w.l.o.g. that s is in normal form. We note that we can always complete s in a form s2 a 2 3 a 3 · · · so that the final strategy has exactly n occurrences of each i. So, we assume w.l.o.g. that s has equal number of occurrences. We write
where the x t 's are non-empty and with no 1 inside. As detailed below, we rewrite x r (and push some steps earlier in x r−1 ) so that we obtain a permutation of the blocks 2 m r , . . . , |D| m r . The rewriting is done by preserving the probability of success (which is 1) and the complexity (which is the optimal complexity). Then, we do the same operation in x r−1 and continue until x 1 . When we are done, each x t becomes a permutation of the blocks 2 m t , . . . , |D| m t . Finally, we normalize the obtained rewriting of s and obtain the result.
We assume that s has already been rewritten so that for each t ′ = t + 1, . . . , r, the x t ′ sub-strategy is a permutation of the blocks 2 m t ′ , . . . , |D| m t ′ . Then, we explain how to rewrite x t . We make a loop for j = 2 to |D|. In the loop, we first regroup all blocks of j's by using Lemma 25 with i = 1: while we can write Interestingly, the sequence m 1 , . . . , m r is unchanged from our starting optimal normal full strategy s. If we rather start from an optimal full strategy s which is not in normal form, we can still see how to obtain this sequence: for each t, m 1 + · · · + m t is the next record number of steps for an attack i after the m 1 + · · · + m t−1 record. That is the number of steps for the attack i when s decides to move to another attack. ⊓ ⊔
Finding the optimal m
We provide here a simple criterion for the optimal m of Th. 17.
Lemma 26. We let D
Let m be such that s = 1 m 2 m · · · is an optimal strategy based on Th. 17 . We have
from which we deduce
which is impossible (given the result from Lemma 26). Consequently, we must have p m = p m+1 . So, in distributions when we have sequences of equal probabilities p t , we can just look at the largest index t in the sequence as a possible candidate for being the value m. Lemma 26 has an equivalent for Th. 21 (given in the full version of this paper due to lack of space).
Applications

Solving sparse LPN
We will model the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem in our STEP game. As we will see, we use the noise bits as the keys the adversary A is trying to guess. First of all, we formally give the definition of the LPN problem. As studied in [6] , the LPN-solving algorithms which are based on BKW [5] have a complexity poly · 2 k log 2 k . The naive algorithm guessing that the noise is 0 and running a Gaussian elimination until this finds the correct solution works with complexity poly · (1 − τ) −k . So, the latter is much better as soon as τ < ln 2 log 2 k , and in particular for τ = k
Definition 27 (Search LPN). Let s
which is the case for some applications [1, 9] . Experiments reported in [6] also show that for τ = k − 1 2 , the Gaussian elimination outperforms the BKW variants for k > 500. The Gaussian elimination algorithm just reduces to finding a k-bit noise vector. It guesses that this vector is 0. If this does not work, the algorithm tries again with new LPN queries. We can see this as guessing at least one k-bit biased vector K i which follows the distribution
The most probable vector is v = 0 which has probability Pr[
The above algorithm corresponds to trying K 1 = 0 then K 2 = 0, ... i.e., the strategy 123 · · · in our framework. We can wonder if there is a better 1 m 2 m 3 m · · · . This is the problem we study below. We will see that the answer is no: using m = 1 is the best option as soon as τ is less than we obtain C D (12 · · · ) = 2 41 . I.e., 2 41 calls to the STEP command which corresponds to collecting k LPN queries and making a Gaussian elimination to recover the secret based on the assumption that the error bits are all 0. If we add up the cost of running Gaussian elimination in order to recover the secret, we obtain a complexity of 2 70 . This outperforms all the BKW variants and proves that
is not a secure instance for a 80-bit security. Furthermore, this algorithm outperforms even the covering code algorithm [12] . Our results are strengthened by the results from [6] where we see that there is a big difference between the performance of C D (12 · · · ) and the one of the covering code algorithm. D i is a composite distribution of uniform ones in the sense defined in Appendix A. Namely, We first computed experimentally the optimal m for the LPN 100,τ instance where we take 0 < τ < For cryptographic parameters, c 1 is optimal. The optimal w depends on τ. The case when τ is lower than 1 k is not interesting as it is likely that no error occurs so all w lead to a complexity which is very close to 1. Conversely, for τ = 1 2 , the exhaustive search has a complexity of c n = 1 2 (2 k + 1) and w = 0 has a complexity of c 1 = 2 k . Actually, D i is uniform in this case and we know that the optimal m completes batches of equal consecutive probabilities. So, the optimal strategy is the exhaustive search.
We now show that for τ < 0.16, the best strategy is obtained for w = 0.
Below, we use p B w = τ w (1 − τ) k−w and c 1 = (1 − τ) −k .
Let w c be a threshold weight and let α = Pr(1 B wc ). For 0 < w ≤ w c , due to Lemma 26, if c B w is optimal we have
5 we obtain c B w > c 1 . This contradicts that w is optimal. For w c = τk, the Central Limit Theorem gives us that α ≈ 1 2 which is less than 4 5 . So, no w such that 0 < w ≤ τk is optimal. Now, for w ≥ w c , we have
By using the bound B w c ≥ 2k . We will discuss this in Section 5.
Solving LPN with O(k) queries. We now concentrate on the m = n case to limit the query complexity to O(k). (In our framework, we need only k queries but we would practically need more to check that we did find the correct value.) So, we estimate the complexity of the full exhaustive search on one error vector x of k bits for LPN, i.e., C D (1 n ). If p t is the probability that x is the t-th enumerated vector, we have C D (1 n ) = ∑ n t=1 t p t . For t between B w−1 + 1 and B w , the sum of the p t 's is the probability that we have exactly w errors. So, C D (1 n ) ≤ ∑ k w=0 B w Pr[w errors]. We approximate Pr[w errors] to the continuous distribution. So, the Hamming weight has a normal distribution, with mean kτ and standard deviation σ = kτ(1 − τ). We do the same for
2 dv. With the change of variables w = kτ + tσ, we have
The distance between the origin (t, v) = (0, 0) and the line v =
By rotating the region on which we sum, we obtain
On Fig. 2 we can see that this approximation of
. Interestingly, the dominant part of log 2 C D (1 n ) is 0.2788 × k and does not depend on τ as long as
. Although very good for the low k that we consider, this approximation of C D (1 n ) deviates, probably because of the imprecise approximation of the B w 's. Next, we derive a bound which is much higher but asymptotically better (the curves crossing for k ≈ 50 000). We now use the bound B w ≤ k w and do the same computation as before. We have
shevsky [16] in the sense that it is asymptotically better and that we use O(k) queries instead of k 1+ε . However, this new bound for C D (1 n ) is very loose.
Outside the scenario of a sparse LPN, we display in Figure 3 the logarithmic complexity to solve LPN in our STEP game when the noise parameter is constant.
Comparing log 2 (C D (1 n )) with the approximation we obtained, i.e. log 2
, we obtain the following results which validate our approximations (See Table 1 ). 
for τ = k − 
Password recovery
There are many news nowadays with attacks and leaks of passwords from different famous companies. From these leaks the community has studied what are the worst passwords used by the users. Having in mind these statistics, we are interested to see what is the best strategy of an outsider that tries to get access to a system having access to a list of users. The goal of the attacker is to hack one account. He can try to hack several accounts in parallel. Within our framework, we compute to see what is the optimal m for the strategy 1 m 2 m · · · . In this given scenario, the strategy corresponds to making m guesses for each user until it reaches the end of the list and starting again with new guesses.
We consider the statistics that we have found for the 10 000 Top Passwords 3 and the one done for the database with passwords in clear from the RockYou hack 4 . Studies on the distribution of user's passwords were also done in [10, 23, 7, 22] . The first casestudy analyses what are the top 10 000 passwords from a total 6.5 million usernamepasswords leaked. The most frequent passwords are the following:
In the case of the RockYou hack, where 32 million of passwords were leaked, we have that the most frequent passwords and their probability of usage is:
Moreover, approximately 20% of the users used the most frequent 5 000 passwords. What these statistics show is that users frequently choose poor and predictable passwords. While dictionary attacks are very efficient, we study here the case where the attacker wants to minimize the number of trials until he gets access to the system, with no pre-computation done. By using our formulas of computing C D (1 m 2 m · · · ), we obtain in both of the above distributions that m = 1 is the optimal one. This means that the attacker tries for each username the most probable password and in average after couple of hundred of users (for the two studies we obtain C D to be ≈ 203 and ≈ 110), he will manage to access the system. We note that having m = 1 is very nice as for the typical password guessing scenario, we need to have a small m to avoid complications of blocking accounts and triggering an alarm that the system is under an attack.
On the phase transition
Given the experience of the previous applications, we can see that for "regular" distributions, the optimal m falls from m = n to the minimal m as the bias of the dis-tribution increases. We let n 1 be such that p 1 = p 2 = · · · = p n 1 = p n 1 +1 and n 2 be such that p n 1 +1 = · · · = p n 1 +n 2 = p n 1 +n 2 +1 . Due to Lemma 26, the magic value m can only be n 1 , n 1 + n 2 , or more. We study here when the curves of C D (1 
n so the second property is satisfied. As an example, for n 1 = n 2 = 1, the first condition becomes α − β ≥ α 2 which is the case of all the distribution we tried for password recovery. The second condition becomes 2 −H ∞ ≥ 2 n+1 , which is also always satisfied. For LPN, we have n 1 = 1, n 2 = k, α = (1 − τ) k , and β = n 2 τ(1 − τ) k−1 . The first and second conditions become
respectively. They are always satisfied unless τ is very close to 
So, we can explain the phase transition in LPN k,τ as follows: if we make τ decrease from 1 2 , for each fixed m, the complexity of all possible C D (1 m ) smoothly decrease. The function for m = n 1 crosses the one of m = n 1 + n 2 before it crosses n+1 2 which is close to the value of the one for m = n. So, the curve for m = n 1 becomes interesting after having beaten the curve for m = n 1 + n 2 . This proves that we never have a magic m equal to n 1 + n 2 . Presumably, it is the case for all other curves as well. This explains the abrupt fall from m = n to m = 1 which we observed on Fig. 1 .
Proof. We have
For the second property, we have
Conclusions
Our framework enables the analysis of different strategies to sequentialize algorithms when the objective is to make one succeed as soon as possible. When the algorithms have the same distribution and are unlimited in number, the optimal strategy is of form 1 m 2 m · · · for some magic m. As the distribution becomes biased, we observe a phase transition from the regular single-algorithm run 1 n (i.e., m = n) to the single-step multiple algorithms 123 · · · (i.e., m = 1) which is very abrupt in the application we considered: LPN and password recovery.
The phase transition phenomenon is further studied. In particular, we show that the fall from m = n to m = 1 does not go through any m ∈ {2, . . . ,
For LPN, the solving algorithm we obtain outperforms the classical ones. When we have a limited number of algorithms, the optimal strategy has the form 1 m 1 · · · |D| m 1 1 m 2 · · · |D| m 2 · · · . For LPN, this simple algorithm outperforms the classical ones, even the one from Asiacrypt 2014 [12] for the relevant parameters using τ ∼ k 
A Composite distributions
We give a formula to compute the optimal strategies for distributions obtained by composing several distributions. The formula is useful when we want to regroup equal consecutive p j 's in a distribution D 1 so that D 1 appears as a composition of uniform distributions. (α 1 p 1,1 , . . . , α 1 p 1,n 1 , α 2 p 2,1 , . . . , α k p k,n Proof. We prove it by induction on i. It is trivial for i = 0. We assume the result holds for i − 1. By induction, we have
The second equality is obtained from the fact that
B Proof of Lemma 25
Proof. We will show below that there exists list i d , x 1 , . . . , x ℓ , i a , y 1 , . . . , y ℓ ′ , j d have no key in common. (For a = 0, we can always split so that x ℓ and y 1 have no key in common by using the first term k of v which is not the last of u: we just take y 1 as a block of k's and x ℓ as a block with no k.) We can apply Lemma 24 and obtain
Since the first and the last terms are equal, all of them are equal. So, we can permute two consecutive blocks which have no index in common. Hence, we can propagate j d earlier until it is stepped before i a , since we know there is no other occurrence of j in the exchanged blocks. We obtain that
as announced. ⊓ ⊔
